The Senate Intelligence Committee report on the CIA and Iraq is huge and was initially available only as hard copy or a scan, neither of which could be searched by any technology more sophisticated than eyeball. MIT has now produced a searchable version [PDF file, c. 15 MB; thanks to JustOneMinute for the tip]. Checking through it, I verified a conclusion that I had reached tentatively on the basis of a more limited reading but have not seen noted anywhere else.
The Committee's summary includes the following statement:
Conclusion 76. Human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered after the production of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), did indicate that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons [emphasis added] as noted in Secretary Powell's speech. [p. 256]
Unless Saddam was delirious or utterly confused about the state of his own arsenal, he can hardly have authorized the use of weapons that did not exist.
Here is what the body of the report says on this subject [pp. 251-2]
Secretary Powell's speech referenced intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons which had been obtained after the IC published the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD programs. Secretary Powell noted in his speech that " . . . we have sources who tell us that [Saddam Hussein] recently has authorized his field commanders to use [chemical weapons]." The IC provided three HUMINT reports which substantiated this statement. The first, dated January [date redacted] 2003, from a CIA [text redacted] said [text redacted] that it would launch missiles armed with chemical and biological agents against northern Iraq, Kuwait and Israel within the first two hours of the initiation of air strikes by U.S. and coalition forces. The [text redacted] reported [text redacted] that the entire Army I Corps had begun to issue atropine injectors and protective masks to soldiers and informed them they were intended to protect them against a U.S. chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attack. [text redacted]
A second CIA HUMINT report [text redacted] said that Saddam Hussein had authorized four field commanders to use "prohibited" weapons if U.S. forces crossed the "red line," a box around Baghdad. Another report, dated September 2002, from a foreign government service, did not say that commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons, but noted that Saddam had ordered that all resources, including chemical and biological weapons, be used to defend the regime from attack. The foreign government service report said that the SSO, under the direction of Qusay Hussein, was in charge of all of Iraq's CBW and that it took an average of 20 minutes to move CBW munitions into place for attack and that the maximum response time was 45 minutes.
The report significantly offers no countervailing considerations to cast doubt on these sources. The drafters' standard practice is to dredge up every possible doubt, reservation and innocent explanation. It is only reasonable to conclude, then, that these intelligence sources were solid enough to withstand skeptical, after-the-fact scrutiny. The corollary is inescapable: Ba'athist Iraq really did have a substantial stock of chemical weapons. A small portion has been found by Coalition forces, largely, it appears, by chance. As to what happened to the rest, Michael Ledeen's speculation strikes me as the solution that Ockham would endorse:
Finally, we come to the really big question, and the weird answer of the committee. The big question is this: How could every serious intelligence agency on earth have come to believe there were WMDs in Iraq when (as the current article of faith has it) there were none? Senator Roberts likens it to a global epidemic. The CIA got it wrong and then infected all the others. A worldwide virus, so to speak. The WMD flu, if you will.
I don't buy it. I don't think the French were swayed by the CIA. I don't think the Israelis and the Russians were infected by our views. I think this is like the David Kay theory of WMDs. Remember? He said that Saddam really believed he had some, because all his guys lied to him about it. He didn't actually have WMDs at all, because the Iraqis had failed, and they feared for their lives if Saddam found them out, and so they lied, and he bought the lies.
These are pretty complicated theories, you must admit. What about a simpler approach? Let's say that there were WMDs. Then, in the disgracefully long period between Afghanistan and Iraq, Saddam, knowing he was gonna be overrun, exported some (mostly to Syria and Iran), destroyed some, and hid some.
That's my story, and I'm sticking with it for the time being. I'm sticking with it because I know — as Senator Roberts and the committee staff know, because I told them — that there are very credible reports of WMD sites, but the CIA chooses not to go look at them. Since I told my own story I've learned about others, one of which comes from a very high-ranking former official of the American government. I'm also sticking with it because the Polish government insists that their guys in Iraq found warheads with chemical weapons, even though a CENTCOM press release denies it, and because Zarkawi's killers arrived in Jordan with large quantities of chemical weapons. And because I don't believe the Iraqis would have bought all those funny suits that protect you from chemical and biological weapons unless they had such weapons and expected to use them.
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