Three years after the beginning of the Iraqi campaign, the chief preoccupation of pundits seems to explaining “what went wrong”. That there is a failure to explain is either presumed at the outset or derived from a comparison of Iraq today against not the realistic alternatives to the present situation but a fantasy picture of success. The enemy didn’t fold up or run away. Terrorists continue to set off bombs in parts of the country. The local politicians don’t get along very well. Hence, all the mal-pensants have concluded, either military action against the Ba’athist regime was a misguided idea, or it has been carried out ineptly.
A favorite accusation by those who once supported the campaign but would now like to turn away is that the United States has committed a fundamental strategic error: We made the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq an overriding priority and, in doing so, placed “Wilsonian idealism” above practical goals. From that blunder flows the resilience of the terrorists and the continuing hostility among ethnic groups. If only we had been wise enough to . . . .
But the sentence is not often completed. The critique rests on the premise that fostering democracy displaced other actions that would have been more efficacious in creating a harmonious Iraq. Rarely do we hear what those other actions might have been, so let’s reflect on what strategic choices were available after Coalition troops reached Baghdad and the Saddamites retreated to their spider holes.
1. We might have done what the “To-Hell-With-Them Hawks” now advocate in retrospect: Leave as soon as the Ba’athists were toppled, leaving it to the indigenes to reassemble the pieces.
2. Having ousted the Ba’athists, we might have invited neighboring countries to keep the peace, again taking no significant part in setting up a new government and removing our troops in short order.
3. We might have followed the course reputedly favored by some in the Pentagon before the war began: Install a government of our choosing, and make free elections a long-term goal, to be undertaken only after Iraq (or perhaps the entire Middle East) was pacified.
4. We might have allowed the Iraqis to form an interim government with little interference (as we in fact did), then postponed elections, as John Kerry and many other Democrats advocated during 2004.
5. We might have imitated the imperial powers of old, ruling Iraq directly as a quasi-colony, much as the United Nations has done in Bosnia and Kosova.
I can’t think of any other options. Would any of those listed have worked better than hurrying Iraq toward democratic self-government? Which would have discouraged foreign and domestic terrorists or reconciled Shi’ites, Sunnis and Kurds?
God never tells us what might have been, but it doesn’t seem challenging to work it out for ourselves.
Strategy 1 would have laid the groundwork for a real, brutal civil war, in which a Shi’ite dictatorship would have slaughtered Sunnis by the thousands and invaded Kurd-controlled enclaves. Looming over the scene would have been the threat or actuality of foreign intervention: by Syria in support of Ba’athist remnants, by Iran in support of pro-Tehran Shi’ites, by Turkey against the Kurds.
Strategy 2 is the same, except with interventionist forces on the ground from the beginning. It is scarcely plausible that Arab troops, almost universally badly trained and worse led, would have conducted as competent a counterinsurgency campaign as the American-led Coalition. Nor would their desire or ability to train Iraqi forces have been high. The best that one could anticipate would be a slightly less bloody level of civil strife than the all-out war of Strategy 1.
Strategies 3 and 4, which are identical concepts save for the identity of the rulers, would be promising if, but only if, an imposed government could solve problems that an elected one can’t. At some times and places, that may be the case. Here and now, it is magical thinking. Why should the indefinite postponement of democracy lead the Ba’athist holdouts or al-Qa’eda to refrain from attacking? Would unelected leaders enjoy greater popular backing than elected ones? Is democracy somehow an incitement to terrorism?
Finally, Strategy 5 was never possible, much though it fits the left-wing stereotype of “war for oil” and “the American Empire”. Had it been tried, we would doubtless have many more soldiers in Iraq and face much fiercer opposition (yes, that can be imagined) at home and abroad.
It may be true that President Bush and his advisors are attached to democracy as a form of government and would have demanded it in Iraq without regard to its merits. They may indeed deserve the “Wilsonian” label. Yet their strategy happens to have coincided with the coldly realistic choice. The most promising route to a peaceful, anti-terrorist Iraq was the establishment of a freely elected government. That could occur only if the United States and its allies insisted that elections be held without waiting for an unattainable level of readiness and provided the force needed to suppress terrorist interference. (Does anyone remember that the terrorists were determined to disrupt all three elections and flopped every time? That’s what “failure” looks like in the MSM looking glass.) There was no reason to expect that democracy would cure all the ills of Iraqi society, but the ills that we see today are of lesser magnitude than the near-certain outcome of the various nondemocratic choices that were open to us.
My own view is that democracy is not a panacea. In the modern world, it has one major advantage over other polities: Democratic elections are the most widely accepted criterion of legitimacy. Their chief rival, unhappily, is conformity to Islamic dogma. It seems to me that the cause of Western civilization in general, and America in particular, is best served by promoting the former and avoiding giving encouragement to the latter. If the critics of the Bush Administration have a better idea, if they wish to argue that the world is ready for a renascence of the Divine Right of Kings, for instance, I’ll be happy to listen to what they say. It isn’t enough, however, to shout “Woodrow! Wilson!” as if attaching a symbolic epithet to the present policy proved it wrong.