Benedict XVI’s lecture last week at the University of Regensburg, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections”, is already the most widely circulated (if not read) and most controversial of a lifetime of voluminous and controversial writings. Since the attacks on it, by both Islamofascists and their Western enablers, are in patent bad faith, intended to demonstrate the might of Islamic extremism rather than call attention to a genuine grievance, they don’t deserve lengthy attention. Still, for the benefit of those who haven’t read more than the context-free reportage, here is the passage for which the New York Times demands the Pope offer “a deep and persuasive apology”:
I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition by Professor Theodore Khoury (Münster) of part of the dialogue carried on – perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara – by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both. It was probably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than the responses of the learned Persian. The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Qur’an, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship of the "three Laws": the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Qur’an. In this lecture I would like to discuss only one point – itself rather marginal to the dialogue itself – which, in the context of the issue of “faith and reason”, I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue.
In the seventh conversation-controversy, edited by Professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the jihad (holy war). The emperor must have known that surah 2, 256 reads: “There is no compulsion in religion”. It is one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under threat. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur’an, concerning holy war. Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the “Book” and the “infidels”, he turns to his interlocutor somewhat brusquely with the central question on the relationship between religion and violence in general, in these words: “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached”. The emperor goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. “God is not pleased by blood, and not acting reasonably is contrary to God’s nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death...”.
The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: Not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature. The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality. Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn [sic; a typo for “Ibn Hazm” (994–1064)] went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God’s will, we would even have to practise idolatry.
Quoting Emperor Manuel’s hostile characterization of Mohammed – “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached” – is outrageous, according to the Times:
Muslim leaders the world over have demanded apologies and threatened to recall their ambassadors from the Vatican, warning that the pope’s words dangerously reinforce a false and biased view of Islam. For many [sic] Muslims, holy war — jihad — is a spiritual struggle, and not a call to violence. And they denounce its perversion by extremists, who use jihad to justify murder and terrorism.
Leaving aside the perhaps pertinent fact that the denunciations of those “who use jihad to justify murder and terrorism” are sparse and sotto voce (how many Moslem leaders have denounced the forced conversion of two Western reporters just last month?), it is a simple historical fact that Moslems in the 14th Century had no qualms about making war to spread their religion. (Peter Robinson has an interesting post on Manuel II’s first-hand experience.) To note that fact as a prelude to presenting an argument against religious compulsion no more “reinforce[s] a false and biased view of Islam” than truthful statements about the Inquisition reinforce a false and biased view of Christianity.
If a sincere Moslem or a secularist dhimmi wishes to find something alarming in Benedict’s words, he should look to the last of the quoted paragraphs. Having grounded Manuel’s argument against violent conversions on the principle that “not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature”, Benedict questions whether Islam acknowledges that principle. For the purpose of this lecture, he is content to leave the issue hanging. The opinion of Ibn Hazm, as transmitted by M. Arnaldez, may or may not represent the consensus of Moslem theologians. What concerns Benedict is that Ibn Hazm has modern counterparts. An influential school of Christian thought, exemplified by Adolf von Harnack and his disciples, does place God’s will outside the realm of reason, dismissing theology based on an intimate connection between the two as a pagan Greek distortion of the purity of the Gospel. The main body of the lecture recounts the history of the “dehellenization” project and warns against its consequences:
[T]he specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by “science” and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective “conscience” becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.
Benedict’s argument can be summarized thus: God wills what is right, but right and wrong are not His arbitrary creations. They are discoverable through human reason. If we define “reason” to exclude such matters, morality devolves into personal taste or the will of the strongest.
Most worryingly, if God’s nature has nothing to do with reason, we have no basis for declining to be ruled by our irrational impulses, for judging between purported revelations or, indeed, for disobeying a fiend with pretensions to godhood.
Hence, Benedict sees the modern separation between Faith and Reason as an illicit divorce, damaging to both partners.
The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur – this is the programme with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time. “Not to act reasonably (with ‘logos’) is contrary to the nature of God”, said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great “logos,” to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures.
For an indication of how Islam, or a significant portion thereof, will respond to this invitation, let us turn to another recent lecture that was a topic of controversy, not because of its content, about which hardly anybody has said anything, but because the speaker was Ayatollah Mohammed Khatami, former president of Iran and a staunch, albeit allegedly “moderate”, supporter of its current government. The topic of the ayatollah’s September 7th lecture at the National Cathedral was the same as the Pope’s: the relationship between Faith and Reason. There was, too, a superficial similarity to their conclusions. Nonetheless, their positions differ toto caelo.
In Benedict’s mind, Christianity joined Faith to Reason from the beginning. He blames their contemporary separation primarily on dehellenizing theologians and sees that development as culminating within his own adult lifetime. (Cf. his opening paragraph, where he lauds the “profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason” shared by the theological and secular faculties when he was a professor at Regensburg thirty-some years ago.) Khatami, by contrast, doesn’t think that a marriage ever existed and places Reason’s assault on Faith much earlier, at the time of the Renaissance:
If one contemplates on the development of philosophy from its origin to the present, one clearly notices that most thinkers in history have in fact moved between two extremes. Modernism (and modernity) is the last cycle in this process. Modernism contains within itself many philosophical, artistic, scientific, historical and ethical components. The common denominator among all these aspects, however, is the catastrophic transformation that toward the end of the Middle Ages penetrated into the depths of the minds of the intellectuals. The new era that we call the Age of Renaissance not only sought to revive the intellectual and cultural heritage of Greece and Rome, but its main objective was to adopt new approaches and ways of expression in relation to religion and its place in human society. The Renaissance-era intellectuals and thinkers defined human beings in a different light. Instead of turning his back to the world and despising material life as the primordial human being had done, the newly defined man was an individual who turned to the world and material life.
From there he proceeds to the ever popular “Islam as victim” narrative:
Man’s success in controlling the world did not stop there. Rather, it turned into aggression and domination that extended beyond the world of nature and to human societies as well. The development that came to be known as colonialism, and was the natural outcome of the domination of modern science over nature, was extended to human sciences as well. The extreme reaction against the absolute domination of the church over man in the Middle Ages, and the denial of his fundamental rights and freedoms, led to another extreme reaction in the form of an encounter between faith and reason in modern times. In the new environment that was created, instrumental rationality confronted faith. As a result, man showed utmost effort to dominate not only nature; but also once this was accomplished, the strong established dominance over weak societies. After the establishment of what we know as Western Civilization, we witnessed the emergence of a belief in both the dominance of that civilization and in the integration of other civilizations or the remnants of other civilizations into a unified Western one.
Some of us can dredge up instances where “the strong established dominance over weak societies” without the benefit of the Renaissance or “instrumental rationality”. One might also observe that Western Civilization is the first ever to express reservations about the expansion of its own sphere. Certainly no record survives of Moslem multiculturalists bemoaning the uprooting of “weak societies” in Egypt or Persia or Anatolia or Spain or India. Ayatollah Khatami does not explain why European conquest differs in kind from the Moslem conquests of the 7th through 17th Centuries or is a unique product of the intellectual viewpoint of the Renaissance. To probe such questions would spoil the purity of the “victim”.
At one time, according to Khatami, Westerners looked forward to “the emergence of a single grand scientific and industrial civilization”.
This over-optimism is gradually fading, however, and it is being replaced with serious reservations and doubts by even westerners themselves. Despite all efforts aimed at summarizing the entirety of Western Civilization in liberal democracy and the multifaceted justification of this point of view, and dreams of an end to history, the rising crisis of modern rational[ism] and modernism on the one hand and the resistance of other civilizations and smaller communities based on faith on the other, and even the emergence of anti-modernist traditional movements in the twentieth century, has created doubts about the ultimate domination of reason-based modern civilization.
To Benedict, the crisis posed by the split between Reason and Faith lies in the loss of a morality based on reason. Khatami’s “crisis” is merely a matter of relative power. Unspecified internal weaknesses, exacerbated by “the resistance of other civilizations and smaller communities based on faith”, stand in the way of “the ultimate domination of reason-based modern civilization”. To resolve the conflict, which he implies is now stalemated, he calls for “a historic dialogue” between “the Orient [sc., Islam – I doubt that he has much room at the table for the non-Moslem civilizations of China, Japan and India], which by definition means guidance and orderliness” and the West. He conceives this “dialogue” as a political negotiation of the most one-sided variety:
The time has come for the West to take a step forward and view itself from another angle. And this is by no means a call for the West to forgo its lofty cultural heritage and civilization. Neither is this an invitation to obscurantism but an attempt at persuading the West to seek new understanding and to better comprehend the cultural geography of the world.
What this means is that “the Orient and specifically the Islamic Orient, can fill the enormous void of spirituality and estrangement from the truth of existence, which today is the great affliction of our world, by reliance upon its moral heritage and transcendental wisdom”, though the void fillers are cautioned against “ostentation and superficiality”. Meanwhile, Islam, Christianity and Judaism “can help mankind solve modern problems and challenges by a return to their vital, vibrant and common essence”. To a Moslem speaker, unless he has become an apostate, the “vital, vibrant and common essence” of the three faiths is nothing other than the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed. No doubt, though, the ayatollah reckoned on his audience of milk-and-water Episcopalians to hear his words as a plea for a vague, ecumenical spirituality.
And what will Islam yield in return for the de facto accession of Christendom to its creed?
At the same time, the East needs to utilize the rationality and prudence of the West in its worldly affairs and must embark on the important path of development.
Financed, one may be sure, by cash from the repentant Westerners.
Looking from a great distance and with squinting eyes, one may say that both Benedict and Khatami criticize Western secularism, but the differences between their critiques are crucial and deep. Benedict’s is, as he puts it, “from within”. It is also symmetrical: Reason without Faith is incomplete, because it then cannot account for “the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based”. On the other hand, Faith operating independently of reason gives birth to moral pathologies. What is needed is for “reason and faith [to] come together in a new way, [to] overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable, and [to] once more disclose its vast horizons”.
Khatami concedes that Faith must make use of reasoning of the elementary sort, “the discerning ability of reason”, but his overall stance is that Faith should command and Reason obey. There is no visible space in that hierarchy for the Emperor Manuel’s “Not acting reasonably is contrary to God’s nature” and hence no hopeful prospect for what the Pope desires: “that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today”.