A constant refrain of anti-war polemics is that Messrs. Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld et al. had no “plan” for Iraq. They (supposedly) expected a long-oppressed people to make an effortless transition to free and democratic self-government and thus failed to take the steps necessary to avert the present “civil war” and “quagmire”.
The truth or falsity of this indictment is an interesting subject for future historical debate. It isn’t self-evident that it ought to be at the center of the debate about what to do next. In particular, if it were true, it would not support the position for which it is most ardently deployed, viz., that the United States ought to withdraw its forces forthwith from Iraq. After all, many wars have begun badly. Almost everything that the Allies did during the first years of World War II was a blunder, from giving Poland a guarantee that couldn’t be honored to assuming that the Ardennes Forest was impassable to putting most of the Soviet Army on the extreme western border of its territory to keeping inadequate watch at Pearl Harbor. Narvik, Crete, Singapore, Kasserine Pass. . . . – The litany of failure rolls on. If Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama had been in Parliament in 1941, they would, I presume, have demanded that England withdraw from Mr. Churchill’s disastrous enterprise.
Critics like Senators Clinton and Obama apparently think that America can rewind to 9/11 and embark on a new course of action unencumbered by all that has happened during the past five and a half years. I have two questions, and a few follow-ups, to pose:
First, since you consider the historical debate so crucial, what is “the plan” that the President ought to have pursued? Presumably, it starts with leaving Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. By the logic of “the Iraqi campaign has made us less safe”, the continued presence in the Middle East of an anti-American despot financed by oil revenue would have made us safer. The unstated but obvious premise is that our actions provoked the terrorists’ violent response. They would hate us less and be less diligent in trying to kill us, if only we had not made war on Ba’athist Iraq.
There is a danger of constructing straw men, but in this case we have only straw with which to work. I have never heard any opponent of the war offer any more cogent reason to think that Saddam’s best interests were congruent with our own. Their attitude seems much like that of Neville Chamberlain during the “Phony War”. As Hitler’s armies overran Poland, British bombers dropped leaflets on the Rhineland. The Prime Minister refused to authorize the bombing of factories and rail lines, because he did not want to provoke the enemy. It wasn’t until months after the war began that England engaged in any offensive action, and then only in the half-hearted Norwegian fiasco. Should Senator Obama ever turn historian, I wonder whether he will blame English intervention in Norway for inciting Hitler to invade France.
Let’s suppose that our liberation of Iraq drew al-Qa’eda into that country, as we are so often told. If we had not invaded, where would it be instead? Would it have just faded away? I’d think that it would have had a pretty good recruiting pitch, pointing to American impotence in the face of a defiant Saddam Hussein and calling on enthusiastic young Moslems to continue the attack against the infidels and Jews. Where the war’s main battle lines would have been drawn is unknowable, but it’s preposterous to say that we would not be fighting somewhere today. And wherever that somewhere was, we would have to face terrorist tactics, unsatisfactory allies and an unwelcome death toll.
Unless one believes that al-Qa’eda and the other Islamofascists really are reasonable fellows who would have dozed contentedly had we not done them unendurable wrong, it is undeniable that we would be at war today, Iraq or no Iraq. We are fighting on a battlefield of our own choosing, with overwhelmingly strong forces and a friendly, if less than fully competent, local government behind us. The war critics’ argument amounts to this: We would have done better to let the enemy choose the battlefield. We don’t know where we would be fighting in that alternative universe, or who our allies would be, or how much force would be needed. Nonetheless, the critics know the unknown alternative would be materially better than reality.
We should give the anti-warriors the chance to explain what their “plan” would have been and why it would have made the world a safer place. Unfortunately, they are never asked and never come forward sua sponte.
Second, what is your plan now? Senator Obama and his ilk declare that, once we are out of Iraq, our troops will be in a position to wage a “real” fight against terrorism. Could we have a few details?
Would a President Obama, Clinton or Edwards send massive reinforcements to Afghanistan? If so, do they pledge not to withdraw even if (i) the conflict looks like a civil war (civil war has been pretty much the default state of Afghan politics since roughly the time of Alexander the Great), (ii) the current government appears to be weak and inept, (iii) the enemy kills civilians in terrorist attacks and (iv) American soldiers suffer casualties? Oh, and if the enemy in Afghanistan draws much of its strength from across the Pakistani border, will they promise not to leave its sanctuaries intact?
If a prospective President is willing to make those commitments to Afghanistan, why not to Iraq? If not, how long will an Afghan campaign last before it falls victim to the same complaints as the one in Iraq?
Let’s think about other possible fronts: Somalia, Lebanon, a preemptive strike against Iran? I’m pretty sure that, if the Democrats would address the issue, their prospective strategy would boil down to this: Withdraw to our own borders, react to what the enemy does, preferably with indictments rather than Marines, and spread lots of money to as many units of government as possible.
But, again, let’s hear them tell us about their plans, not as abstractions (“fighting smarter”) but as concrete propositions. It would, I suspect, be highly educational for the electorate.