At least three conflicts are going on in Iraq. Separating them in our minds would promote clarity of thought.
The first is the effort of al-Qa’eda and its allies to drive the Coalition forces out of the country. This is a “war of choice” on the enemy’s part, which both Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have declared to be the front line in their struggle to establish a world-dominating Islamic caliphate. Mufsidun have poured in to fight beside “al-Qa’eda of the Land of the Two Rivers”. Al-Qa’eda will win this conflict if America pulls out, and the West will win if the mufsidun give up.
The second is a civil war between two loose factions that want to replace Iraq’s democratic government with a dictatorship – either a revival of the Ba’athist regime or one emulating (and controlled by) the Iranian mullarchy. Both al-Qa’eda and Iran see advantages for themselves in fostering this conflict by aggravating enmity between the Sunni and Shi’ite communities. All the belligerents in this war oppose the elected Iraqi government and can do nothing unless it collapses. Therefore, they have dual objectives: to defeat the government and to defeat the other faction; in what order matters very little.
Finally, the elected leaders of the government disagree sharply on a variety of matters. Some are, in fact, spokesmen for one or the other of the pro-dictatorship factions. The rest aim to employ democratic means get the best possible arrangements for themselves and their constituents. This conflict is political rather than military, though the presence of anti-democrats in Parliament may blur the boundaries between it and the dictatorial camp’s aspirations for a coup d’etat.
The most obvious fact about the first conflict is the absurd disproportion between the enemy’s means and its ends. Far inferior in numbers, leadership, equipment and technology, the mufsidun have zero hope of defeating the Coalition on the battlefield. They barely have the capability for minor harassment. Recognizing this fact, they have fixed their strategy around America’s conspicuous weakness: the unwillingness of much of our political class to engage in long wars, even if casualties are low and costs affordable. In normal times, that would have been an unlikely road to success. It didn’t work for the Serbs in Bosnia, for instance. It is our enemy’s good fortune that many prominent figures on the American Left are consumed by irrational hatred of the incumbent Administration and regard its defeats as their own victories. Bush Derangement Syndrome may succeed for the mufsidun where force of arms fails.
The second conflict is, like much contemporary ethnic and sectarian strife, largely the artificial product of ambitious demagogues. In and of itself, the Sunni-Shi’a split began with an issue – must the caliph of Islam be a member of Mohammed’s family? – that lost its burning practical relevance in the 7th Century. Since then, the “sects” (probably too grand a name for them) have been little more than geographical markers. Each has customs and folkways of its own, but their religious significance is trivial. They would be no more divisive than the divergences between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Judaism, were it not for their appropriation as handy instruments for assembling mobs.
In this case, al-Qa’eda and the mufsidun perceive that vigorous bloodletting between Sunni and Shi’ite reinforces the arguments of the pro-retreat faction in America, so they have helped matters along with abundant atrocities against civilians. The “sectarian” fighting started in earnest when al-Qa’eda bombed the bombing of the al-Askareyya Shrine in February 2006, sparking Shi’ite outrage that extremist leaders channeled into counter-atrocities against ordinary Sunnis. Iran has gladly lent a hand by supplying arms to both its puppet Moqtada al-Sadr and Ba’athists who yearn for a new Saddam Hussein.
For a long time, the American strategy was to do what the Left says we ought to do: Pay little attention to internecine struggles in Iraq, and concentrate on our direct enemies. So we pursued al-Qa’eda and generally ignored the “Mahdi Army”. The “Surge” changes that policy, with the goal of winning the first conflict decisively in a fairly short time and damping the other two. The change wasn’t dictated by facts on the ground but by facts in Washington. From the hazy perspective of the Potomac, every time a terrorist murdered a group of schoolchildren, he strengthened the “proof” that America had “lost” and that it was only a matter of time before helicopters would be airlifting the last remnants of our army from the rooftops of Baghdad. So winning the war on the home front entailed adding the pro-dictatorial militias to our enemies’ list.
Inevitably, given the magical thinking that is so commonplace in Washington, the Surge included resolution of the third conflict, the hurly-burly of Iraq’s political factions, among its goals. American policy wonks devised a set of legislative proposals that, according their calculations, would give each interest group its fair and reasonable share of the spoils of government, from which national reconciliation would blossom.
The Iraqi Parliament hasn’t rushed to enact these foreign-written prescriptions into law. Maybe that is because Iraqis are incapable of governing themselves and are doomed to an ineluctable slide into chaos. Or maybe it is because the responsible members of Parliament doubt that either the al-Qa’eda invaders or the local anti-democrats will be appeased by laws concerning the allocation of oil revenues and the eligibility of former Ba’athists for government jobs.
None of the proposals that Washington has elevated to the level of “benchmarks” has much to do with fundamental principles. Their goal isn’t to make Iraqi society more open, to extend the realm of liberty or to protect oppressed minorities (Christians, for example). No, they represent an attempt to micromanage relationships about which we don’t know a great deal. Mesopotamia est omnis divisa in partes tres sounds truer here than in Baghdad or Mosul or Ramadi or Kirkuk.
Leftist sensitivity to other cultures stops at the Euphrates, it seems. The Baghdad government is declared to be an irredeemable failure unless it conforms to American dictates, though the same critics objected to America’s “imposition” of democracy. Worse still, Iraqi nonconformity has been enlisted as an excuse for giving up on the military conflicts and dismissing as irrelevant all the evidence that those wars are turning in favor of the Iraqi freedom.
The Left has an excellent chance of winning the battle that it wants to win, where the objective is to abandon Iraq to its fate. If so, the price of victory will be the transformation of its own ideology into one that is insouciant toward mass murder, scornful of the ability of foreigners to govern themselves and hostile toward democracy. The latest version of the Left looks more and more like the racist, blimpish Right of yore. I confess to an absence of surprise. The affinity between the leftist notion of liberty and practical totalitarianism was clear to Edmund Burke two centuries ago. Each passing decade has confirmed it, and the debate over Iraq is a kind of culmination.