Twelve months ago, the idea that America could do anything to improve conditions in Iraq was controversial, to say the least. The Left had settled on a “narrative”: We were standing between the combatants in a civil war. Without our presence, Iraq might become a huge humanitarian disaster, but it was bound to be a disaster in any event. All that we did by staying there was expose our troops to needless risk and inflame Moslem opinion against us.
Obviously, circumstances in Iraq have changed markedly for the better since then. Between that improvement and President Bush’s decision to wage war more vigorously, instead of accepting the “realistic” counsel to cut back and leave Iraq’s fate in other hands, there may be a bit of a connection. The theory of coincidence hasn’t gained a great deal of traction, though I’m sure that it’s clung to in a few desperate corners of the Angry Left. The preferred course hasn’t been to fashion a new Iraq narrative that accounts for the phenomena but simply to ignore (or strive to find a dark side to) everything that has happened and stick to the old policy prescriptions. Thus “Santa Hillary” places “Bring the Troops Home” under the national Christmas tree. All the facts may have changed, but the conclusion remains the same.
Suppose that the President had heeded the advice of Senator Clinton, the Iraq Study Group and the elite media. How would the war against the mufsidun stand today?
There were three sides to what one might call the “Non-Bush Consensus Strategy” as formulated in early 2007. The first priority was reducing American troop strength in Iraq and redirecting the remaining forces to training and support roles. That step was not, however, supposed to be tantamount to giving up on either Iraq in particular or the War on Terror in general. Replacing our military presence in Iraq would be “engagement” with the country’s neighbors, who would be encouraged to mediate among the rival factions. Meanwhile, American troops would pour into Afghanistan to quell the much feared Taliban/al-Qa’eda comeback there.
No one can know what might have been, but don’t the following seem highly likely?
Iraq’s politically significant neighbors are Turkey, Iran, Saudi-controlled Arabia and Syria – not an harmonious quartet. The ISG and Foggy Bottom may imagine that they can be brought together to pursue a happier future for Iraq, but isn’t it more probable that, with American influence waning, each would have pursued its own national interests? For Turkey, that means hot pursuit of Kurdish terrorists (only U.S. pressure has limited Turkish incursions so far); for Iran and its semi-puppet Syria, greater power in the hands of pro-Iranian Shi’ite leaders like Moqtada al-Sadr (recently cowed by the “surge” into ordering his followers to observe a cease fire); for the Saudis, minimizing the danger of a revival of Saddam Hussein’s drive to the south.
Had these parties been able to reach a grand deal, it could hardly have made the situation better from the West’s point of view. The lowest common denominator would be a central government controlled by the mullarchy’s friends, a rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh guaranteeing the safety of the Saudi oligarchs, bribes to al-Qa’eda in return for taking its battle elsewhere, and a free hand for Turkey in northern Iraq: that is, an anti-Western regime in Baghdad, the expansion of Iranian hegemony into Mesopotamia and Arabia, greater resources for the mufsidun, and a war between hitherto pro-Western Turkey and Kurdistan.
The alternative to a settlement on those unappealing lines would be an unambiguous civil war, pitting Iranian-backed Shi’ites against Saudi-backed Sunnis (including al-Qa’eda, the strongest Sunni force as of the beginning of 2007). The Turko-Kurdish conflict is part of both scenarios. In neither would there be any force within Iraq possessing the power and the will to keep the PKK in check. Only the U.S. has a hope of persuading the Kurdish authorities that it is in their own best interests to avoid giving aid and comfort to terrorists of their own nationality and discouraging Turkey from engaging in violent self-help.
A bigger American force in Afghanistan would doubtless have limited enemy gains, but that war will grind on endlessly so long as al-Qa’eda and the Taliban have sanctuaries in Pakistan. The ideal solution would be a joint Paki-NATO campaign to clear the mufsidun from Waziristan. That would be a tougher, bloodier prospect than the “surge” in Iraq. Amateurs like Barack Obama and Mike Huckabee may casually recommend it, but it’s scarcely conceivable. Would a shaky Pakistani government sanction what would be labeled a “Christian invasion” of its territory? If it did, would Democrats and liberals retain their enthusiasm as the casualties mounted? Would they be willing to help police the Pakistani frontier for years to come? On the other hand, if we carefully confined our power to one side of the border, how long would it take for the Afghan campaign to become as frustrating and unpopular as the Iraqi one was at the end of 2006?
Some on the Left have been straining to link our presence in Iraq to the assassination of Benzair Bhutto. Suppose that we had a many more troops in Afghanistan. It would then be a cinch to argue that the murder, and the popularity of the mufsidun with the Pakistani public, was an angry reaction to our inflammatory proximity to their country’s borders. The Clinton-Obama-Edwards-Kossack talking points practically write themselves. They wouldn’t be true – Pakistan’s plight arises from decades of governmental failure – but the elite media would fall for them, and the American Left would by now be following its Canadian cousins in demanding that Kabul be thrown away like Baghdad. “Bring the troops home” would still be Hillary’s Christmas promise.
What about the broader War on Terror? Our counterfactual hands al-Qa’eda two huge propaganda points: that they “forced” America out of Iraq and are fighting it bravely in Afghanistan. In the real universe, Osama bin-Laden and his lieutenants have been placed on the rhetorical defensive, imploring the mufsiun not to give up on Iraq and issuing increasingly strident and non-credible threats against a growing cohort of enemies.
If you were an angry young Moslem, which scenario would more strongly move you to take up arms and risk your life, rather than safely grumble - the one in which your side is humiliating the giaours or the one in which it is being humiliated?
There are no controlled experiments in history, but the year 2007 comes close.
Further reading: Michael Barone, “Surge 101”
The Daily Telegraph, “General Petraeus: Man with a Message of Hope”
William Kristol, “General David Petraeus: Man of the Year”
Victor Davis Hanson, “A Long War in a Nutshell”
If President Bush can be forgiven for not knowing the name of the president of Pakistan in 2000, perhaps the liberals can be forgiven for having had a dark view of the situation in Iraq early in 2007. At that point, for almost four years we were fed a steady diet of optimism from the administration. Whatever happened was always good. Did casualties decrease? That was a sign we were "winning the war." Did casualties increase? That was a sign that we were also winning, because the other side was becoming "desperate." Corpses, no corpses, it mattered not because we were always winning.
With the ISG report of December 2006 (as I recall) the false optimism finally became unfashionable, and it was clear that something other than the status quo had to be done.
Then came the "surge," one of several "reality-based" options. In the beginning, even Gen. Petraeus did not know if it would work. At this point it is not clear the extent to which the surge was responsible for a reduction in attacks, nor it is clear what will happen when we are finally "unsurged." It may be that attacks were reduced at least in part simply because the ethnic cleansing had already been largely accomplished. With a couple of millions of refugees and tens of thousands of dead civilians, even the most enthusiastic jihadi may begin to run out of targets. Or it may be that a number of people just got tired of killing each other. While there is no doubt a certain joy in murdering others and wearing the blood of one's enemy on one's clothing, even that may in time get old, and new entertainments are needed.
Of course, the interesting question is why it took the administration four years to adopt a counter-insurgency strategy in a situation that clearly called for it.
But at this point the jury is still out on Iraq. No doubt we will be there for a very long time. Costs will continue to soar, more of our nice young people will return by way of body bag or stretcher, multiple deployments will continue to grind away at our military personnel, and Afghanistan will continue to deteriorate. But by golly, we will have shown Al Qaeda that we have "staying power." And as long as we have unlimited resources and no other serious military situation arises, we'll do just fine.
Posted by: Jim H. | Tuesday, January 01, 2008 at 10:37 AM