What’s the News from Basra?

I don’t know. Which makes me wiser, by Socrates’s standard, than a great many pundits who have started telling us who won and lost in the clashes between government forces and the “Madhi Army” in Iraq’s second largest city, as well as what will “inevitably” happen next. Much of this commentary is what Sherlock Holmes would have dismissed as speculation in advance of the evidence. Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, both military historians, have posted an incisive article (“The Basra Business”) summarizing (as of yesterday afternoon) “what we can say with confidence about recent operations and what we cannot”.

Among the unknowns are most of the hard data needed to evaluate how the fighting went on the ground and why it abruptly ended.

How well did the ISF fight in Basra and, in general, what actually happened there? The absence of partnered Coalition Forces in the city makes it extremely difficult to understand the nature of the fighting and the Iraqi forces’ performance – long experience in the limitations of stringers and “eyewitnesses” or hospital sources in places where we did know what had actually happened should leave us skeptical of all initial reports of combat coming out of Basra. . . .

Did Maliki accept a deal with Sadr in return for his stand-down order and, if so, what was involved? We know what Sadr’s demands were (at least publicly), but he ordered his forces to stop fighting before Maliki publicly accepted his terms.

We also don’t know the future, e. g.,

Who will gain or lose more credit in the eyes of the Iraqi people, and particularly the Shia-Maliki or Sadr? . . .

Will Maliki persist in his efforts to disarm JAM [the Mahdi Army] and Special Groups [Iran’s direct proxies] or will he lose his nerve? . . .

How will JAM and Special Groups react? Will they continue with or accelerate the offensive they had already been conducting since the start of the year, or has this operation blunted that offensive and thrown them off-balance?

It’s remarkable how many reporters, editorial writers, U.S. politicians and bloggers can tell us the answers to those questions already. The consensus of the news media is that Moqtada al-Sadr, nominal leader of the Mahdi Army, is in a stronger position than ever, having “won” because the central government didn’t carry through with its ambitious project of destroying his movement in Basra. For what they’re worth, one can read opposing viewpoints at the Belmont Club: An optimistic appraisal is quoted, and a lengthy comment presents a convoluted reply by a left-wing blogger (which, I must say, reminds me a bit of those right-wing analyses in the 1960’s arguing that the Sino-Soviet split was just a deception).

What we do know is less extensive but not uninteresting. Most significant, I think, is that Prime Minister Maliki thought that an all-Iraqi operation could regain control of Basra from the Sadrists and Iranians. What’s more, on the surface at least, that cockiness (as most observers would call it) was not wholly unjustified:

The ISF operation did not clear Basra or destroy either Special Groups or the Mahdi Army.

But the ISF performed remarkably well, moving numerous units to Basra on short notice, establishing them in the city, engaging in hard fighting, and stopping only when Sadr caved.

On the other side, the outcome was not so happy:

The Sadrists and Special Groups failed to set Iraq alight despite their efforts – Iraqi forces kept the Five Cities area (Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Diwaniyah, and Kut) under control with very little Coalition assistance; Iraqi and Coalition forces kept Baghdad under control.

Sadr never moved to return to Iraq, ordered his forces to stop fighting without achieving anything, and further demonstrated his dependence on (and control by) Iran. . . .

On March 30, Sadr ordered his followers to stop fighting. This decision contrasts with his 2004 decision to fight on, and his continued presence in Iran combined with this surrender results from weakness, rather than strength.

These appearances could be illusory. Many of the aforementioned commentators insist that they must be. A popular parallel is the aftermath of last year’s Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, where Israel did better militarily but is generally perceived to have lost through its failure to render Hezbollah impotent. There is some resemblance but also an important distinction: Israel broke off the fighting unilaterally. Iraq did not. Instead, its enemies declared a truce, which it apparently has felt no obligation to observe.

While we can’t be sure how this offensive, whether half a success or half a failure, will affect Iraqis’ views of the Prime Minister, it is remarkably more than very many foreigners thought his government could do. According to his detractors, Mr. Maliki leans more toward Tehran than Washington and has at his disposal an army that can accomplish nothing without massive American support. In Basra, he acted against Iran’s close allies, and his troops were able to perform creditably under difficult circumstances. Non-vatic though I am, that looks like a good omen to me.

Further reading: Kimberly Kagan, “The Second Iran-Iraq War”:

Senior officials of the Iranian government, the U.S. military has noted in press briefings, support and in some cases control, illegal armed groups that are fighting American forces and undermining the Iraqi government. In particular, the recent fighting in Basra and Baghdad is not at root a civil war between Iraqi Shia political factions, but an ongoing struggle between the Iraqi government and illegal militias organized, trained, equipped and funded by Iran.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Security Forces are now fighting these militias, a long-standing demand of the U.S. that was articulated in congressional benchmarks in 2006. The question for Americans is simple: Will we support Iraq in this fight, or abandon its government and people? . . .

Mr. Maliki demonstrated his willingness to challenge Shiite militias and Iran in the Shiite heartland of Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces ably demonstrated their capability to defend central Iraq, and quell an uprising of the Mahdi Army and the Special Groups in the most important cities between Baghdad and Basra. The remaining security problems in Basra will have to be addressed in future operations, which we should encourage the government of Iraq to undertake after additional planning and, perhaps, reinforcement. . . .

Iran and Mr. Sadr could not simply unleash a floodtide of violence that would overwhelm Iraqi Security Forces partnered with U.S. units, because they are more capable of handling the situation. For all of his nationalist rhetoric, Mr. Sadr is evidently not in control of his movement – it appears that the decision to fight or not rested with the Qods Force commander and not with him. But Mr. Sadr’s militia remains a reserve from which the Special Groups can and will draw in crisis.

These events provide an enormous opportunity for either the U.S. or for Iran – and whichever state responds most intelligently and quickly to the circumstances on the ground will gain the benefit. The U.S. should encourage the Iraqi government to defeat Iran’s proxies and agents, and should provide the requisite assistance. It should encourage and support the Iraqi government’s laudable determination to establish the rule of law throughout Iraq, not just where U.S. forces are present. . . .

Above all, the U.S. must recognize that Iran is engaged in a full-up proxy war against it in Iraq. Iranian agents and military forces are actively attacking U.S. forces and the government of Iraq. Every rocket that lands in the Green Zone should remind us that Iran’s aims are evidently not benign – they are at best destabilizing and at worst hegemonic. The U.S. must defeat al Qaeda in Iraq, and protect Iraq from the direct military intervention of Iran. Failure to do so will invite Iranian domination of an Arab state that now seeks to be our ally.