For once, it isn’t true that “Victory has a hundred fathers; defeat is an orphan”. Oh, in the dexterosphere, for which today is V-I Day, praise will be ladled out to General Petraeus and even to the President who made the decision to put him in command, but the consensus of bien-pensants is that (a) the Iraqi campaign wasn’t an American victory and (b) it wasn’t won by anything America did.
The Obama Version falls into the mainstream of conventional wisdom: The Sunnis in Anbar province spontaneously rose up against al-Qa’eda, motivated by revulsion against its harsh treatment of their tribes. American and allied forces were bystanders, and the “surge” that began shortly after the first stirring in Anbar was a coincidence rather than a cause. According to this “narrative” (hereafter, NINNY, the “New Iraq Nattering Nabobs Yarn”), the Anbar Awakening would have taken place even had there been no U.S. Marines at hand to lend it firepower and expertise.
The vision of the “people’s revolution” against oppression is dear to the Left, for two reasons: First, it casts a warm glow over left-wing revolutions, such as the French and the Russian and the Cuban, that ushered in regimes far more vicious than what they replaced. Second, it provides a handy excuse for passivity in foreign affairs. Hostile tyrants will be overthrown without our having to act – and it they aren’t, their continuance in power demonstrates that they are not really tyrants.
Hence, resolute leftists opposed doing anything about Saddam Hussein. The irresolute were swept along with the post-9/11 tide, then, when the fighting continued, regressed to their mean and called for acquiescence in defeat. The principal motive for the NINNY is to justify their position by stripping victory of its paternity and blurring the distinction between success and failure.
How closely the NINNY corresponds to reality isn’t of interest to historians only. History, in the hands of polemicists, is a form of propaganda. That’s why, for instance, pro-communist A. J. P. Taylor and anti-American Pat Buchanan, two advocates of a wholly passive U.S. foreign policy, have zealously promoted the canard that Adolf Hitler had only moderate, realistic ambitions for Nazi Germany. The canard at the heart of the NINNY likewise leads to passivity.
The NINNY’s fundamental flaw lies in its axiom that Islamofascist terrorism will inevitably inspire revolt. That is not what history shows. The tactics of al-Qa’eda in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan are, in fact, based not on a mere taste for brutality but on what has worked for similar movements in the past.
The first great success of Moslem arms against a Western nation was the Algerian revolt against France. There the rebels’ treatment of the local population featured “the systematic and gruesome slaughter of large numbers of Muslims to show everybody, French and Muslims, who was boss”. Terrorization “was a permanent and systematic modus operandi”. [Laurent Murawiec, The Mind of Jihad (2008), pp. 297–8]. The effect was not, as the NINNY would have predicted, an “Algerian Awakening”. Perhaps (indeed, probably) something of the sort could have been incited by a French counterpart to General Petraeus. Malhereusement pour la belle France, its commanders relied on counter-terror, which “worked” in the narrow sense of keeping the Moslem majority in a state of perpetual fear but didn’t gain allies and eventually, fatally lost support in the mother country.
In Iraq and Afghanistan (and elsewhere), the mufsidun have emulated the tactics that triumphed in Algeria. There is no strong reason to think that the NINNY strategy of leaving it to the victims to help themselves will be, or would have been, an effective countermeasure.
Before the NINNY becomes immovably entrenched, the real history of the Iraqi campaign needs to be told. Like the history of any other war, it contains a fair share of folly and blunder. Those are what the media’s “zeroth draft of history” highlights, reflecting the preposterous notion that making a plan in advance and adhering to it faithfully are the benchmarks of military competence, but they proved unimportant. What’s remarkable – nay, astonishing – about the American performance in Iraq is the speed and skill with which our civilian and military leaders adapted to the unexpected and overcame the friction of war. Consider this short list of feats that were declared impossible until they were accomplished (after which they were instantly taken for granted):
The thorough defeat, in scarcely three weeks and with trivial American and allied casualties, of an Iraqi army larger than the invading force and supposedly (the MSM told us repeatedly) “battle-hardened”;
the capture of Baghdad by a coup de main, without the Stalingrad-like siege that the “experts” had predicted;
the organization of successful elections, notwithstanding a determined terrorist campaign to disrupt them (recall that John Kerry promised, if elected, to cancel the one scheduled for January 2005, declaring that it was bound to be a fiasco);
and, finally, the eradication of a powerful terrorist apparatus in a period of less than a year and a half, counting from the beginning of the “surge” (comparable achievements elsewhere have taken years or decades).
The Second Gulf War has the highest ratio of controversy to casualties of any in our country’s history. Once contemporary passions subside, however, there can be little doubt that Iraq will be the case study of how to win an anti-insurgent campaign. Names like Rumsfeld and Petraeus will sit comfortably beside Grant and Lee, while George W. Bush will gain the reputation of a wartime President on a par with Roosevelt, if not Lincoln. In a century or so, the fathers of victory will be acknowledged. I hope, though, that their just due doesn’t have to wait quite that long.