For the next several news cycles, I anticipate, we will hear much from the Obami about the virtues of “leading from behind”. It worked in Libya, we’ll be told. Colonel Gadhafi and his brood of vipers are gone, no American blood and little American money have been expended, and who but a carping partisan can complain? The end proves that the means were justified.
Success deserves an accolade, it is true, yet this success is an odd one, for it crowns a strategy that seemed almost to have failure as its objective. Gadhafi would have been gone months ago if the United States had imposed a no-fly zone at the outset of the Libyan uprising, when the regime was in disarray and the insurgents were sweeping through the country almost unopposed. Instead the President waited while Gadhafi assembled a mercenary army, recaptured key cities and reduced his enemies to little more than their Benghazi redoubt. When we intervened at last, it was almost too late. Then, after an initial round of air and missiles strikes, we withdrew from active combat, leaving the burden of fighting on the shoulders of Britain, France, Italy and lesser powers. It’s vastly to their credit that they undertook the task, but their forces were quantitatively and qualitatively barely up to it. Their militaries are now exhausted, their munitions stocks are depleted, and their defense budgets are in disarray.
Just a couple of weeks ago, it looked like European leaders were on the verge of giving up, hinting that compromise between Gadhafi and the rebels might be the best feasible outcome. Had victory been delayed much longer, it is doubtful that it would have come at all.
The Obama Administration insisted on justifying the Libyan war “kinetic military action” as an humanitarian venture. From that point of view, it was a failure, bordering on disaster. Keeping America on a leash minimized the cost to us. To the people of Libya, it meant thousands of unnecessary casualties, hundreds of millions of dollars in destroyed property and lost oil revenue, and a heightened risk that the next act will be civil war rather than a transition to the rule of law.
The effect on our national interests remains to be seen. Nobody pretends to know a lot about the rebels, except that they are a congeries of factions, some apparently pro-Western and democratic, others no friendlier to us than Gadhafi was. There is no sign that the Administration will take any steps to enhance the position of potential friends or thwart the designs of hard-core enemies, and our passive attitude during the war is unlikely to have earned a large stock of good will. If the government that ultimately takes shape in Tripoli is on our side in the War on Terror, the credit will go to good luck.
Happily, luck may run our way. Gadhafi has screamed for over 40 years that America is his Enemy Number One. In Libyan eyes, that’s bound to be a recommendation, notwithstanding that our enmity has of late been somewhat muted. If Libya emerges as our friend, Ronald Reagan will, I think, deserve a large share of the credit.