Here is an interesting report, dated yesterday:
President Joe Biden announced on Wednesday that the U.S. would for the first time send 31 of the sophisticated [M1 Abrams] tanks to aid Ukraine’s war effort. Speaking anonymously during a press briefing, a senior administration official acknowledged that those tanks could roll on Crimea.
“We want to make sure that [the Ukrainians] have the capabilities to not only defend themselves against the Russian onslaught … but also that they have the ability to retake, to reclaim their sovereign territory, and that means everything that is recognized by international borders,” the official said.
The official was asked to clarify whether they meant retaking territory in Crimea or in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, where Russia purported to annex several areas last year.
“Crimea is Ukraine,” the official responded. “We’ve never recognized the illegal annexation of Crimea. But where the Ukrainians decide to go and how they decide to conduct operations in their country, those are their decisions to make.”
That “senior official” may be an outlier. The Biden Administration’s enthusiasm for Ukrainian victory seems to wax and wane unpredictably. The decision to equip Ukraine with our top-of-the-line armored fighting vehicles followed days of insistence that the country’s armed forces didn’t need and couldn’t effectively use M1’s. Still, the quoted statement raises a question that isn’t often addressed but will need to be answered if the current war is to come to a satisfactory conclusion: What should happen to Crimea?
Neither Ukraine nor Russia has strong historical ties to the peninsula. After the Mongol invasions in the 13th Century, it fell under the rule of the Golden Horde, then of the Ottoman Empire, then, briefly, of an independent Crimean Tatar state. In 1783, Catherine the Great annexed it to the Russian Empire. During the Russian Civil War, it was a White bastion under a democratic Tatar regime. After the Bolshevik triumph, it became the “Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic”. Agriculture was collectivized with the usual communist brutality. The Tatars were subjected to forced Russification. During World War II, they were deported en masse to the Russian far east. After the war, the “autonomous republic” was demoted to an oblast.
In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, an action of zero political significance. It wasn’t a recognition of any Ukrainian character. According to the 1959 census, ethnic Ukrainians made up only 22 percent of the population.
In the referendum on Ukrainian independence in December 1991, Crimea had the lowest voter turnout (68 percent versus 84 percent for Ukraine as a whole) and the lowest percentage of “yes” votes (57 percent in Sevastopol, 54 percent in the rest of Crimea; next lowest voting district was 83.9 percent). Those figures suggest tepid enthusiasm for the Ukrainian connection.
In 1992, the Crimean parliament voted to declare independence from Ukraine, then retracted the declaration the next day. In 1994, Yuri A. Meshkov, a supporter of Crimean independence and closer ties with Russia, won the Crimean presidency. A referendum endorsed greater autonomy for Crimea and dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship for its residents, but the movement fizzled out as the separatists turned to fighting among themselves. The Crimean parliament and presidency were subsequently abolished (ironically, by a Ukrainian president known for his pro-Russian sympathies).
Also in 1994, Russia and Ukraine agreed to the Budapest Memorandum, which recognized Crimea as an integral part of Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine’s surrender of its nuclear weapons. That agreement seemed to settle Crimea’s status – until Russia’s “little green men” invaded in 2014 and, almost bloodlessly, seized control. A referendum in March 2014 supposedly gave 97 percent approval to annexation to Russia, but polls taken shortly before the Russian takeover showed majority opposition to joining Russia, and “a report by Russian human rights experts that was posted on the website of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights found that turnout was only 30 to 50 percent, with just 50 to 60 percent of participants voting in favor of annexation”.
Now it is 2023, Ukraine and Russia are at war, and among Ukraine’s overt war aims is the recovery of Crimea. The strongest basis for the Ukrainian claim is the Budapest Memorandum. If this were the 18th Century, when sovereigns exchanged territories like trading cards, that argument would have heavy weight, but the notion has since developed that the inhabitants of a region should have a major say in who rules them. One can hardly say with confidence what the Crimeans, given a free choice, would prefer, and no alternative looks very satisfactory.
The first idea that comes to mind is a referendum. Let Crimeans vote for Ukraine or Russia. That would indeed resolve the issue if one side or the other won decisively, but there’s no good reason to expect that outcome. A close vote would leave the losers discontented and determined to try again, a pattern that we’ve seen in Scotland and Quebec, while nationalists in the losing party’s preferred partner would press their government to work for a reversal (not necessarily peaceful) of the electoral verdict.
Unpromising as a solution via referendum is, annexation without any formal expression of popular consent, or with a phony plebiscite like the farce of 2014, would be worse, for reasons that are too obvious to need stating.
What about independence? In different circumstances, an independent Crimea with its own national identity might obviate the current ethnic divisions. In the world as it exists, there are drawbacks. Eastern Europe doesn’t need a minuscule state (about the size of Houston in population and Vermont in area) in a strategic location, encircled by neighbors (Russia, Ukraine, Turkey) with motives for interfering in its affairs.
All in all, it seems that Crimea is not a “problem”. Problems have solutions. Crimea may have none. If, as somebody in the Biden Administration thinks would be a good idea, Ukraine recovers it by force of arms, that won’t bother me at all, but the event will be just another stage in the conflict, not its end.