If it weren’t for the speculation about his motives, Colin Powell’s endorsement of Barack Obama would already be forgotten. Of course, the rationale that the general presented on Meet the Press was such a combination of the conventional (the alleged nastiness of the McCain campaign), the preposterous (adolscent adulation of Slick Barry’s temperament and intellect) and the out-of-touch (the supposed rightward movement of the Republican Party) that it invited motive-mongering.
Some of the suggested motives are pretty clearly wrong. It’s unlikely, for instance, that race had anything to do with it. General Powell’s alienation from the Republican Party was obvious well before Barack Obama became the Democratic nominee for President. He would almost certainly have endorsed Hillary Clinton. He could have called her a “transformative figure”, too, and she has demonstrated deeper intellect and a steadier temperament than the neophyte Obama.
As to why this lifelong Republican now favors a down-the-line partisan Democrat for President, there is one donkey in plain sight: the Powell Doctrine, first set forth in a 1992 article in Foreign Affairs. General Powell wrote in the aftermath of the First Gulf War, with an eye toward justifying President Bush père’s military actions, including his decision not to complete the victory in Iraq by ousting the Ba’athist regime.
To a large extent, the Powell Doctrine is simply a restatement of the Clausewitzian principle that going to war is useful only if it serves the nation’s political ends. What makes it distinctive is its insistence that the only acceptable military outcomes are quick, low-casualty victories with minimal complications in the aftermath. That point may not be fully evident from the Foreign Affairs article, which indeed states: “This is not to argue that the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift and overwhelming.” That was, however, a pro forma reservation to cover extraordinary situations like World War II. For the normal course of events, the Powell approach was to undertake nothing difficult or dangerous. The interventions that he praised (e. g., the overthrow of Manuel Noriega in Panama and Operation Eastern Exit, the 1991 raid that rescued the U.S. Embassy staff in Somalia from a rebel siege) were all of that kind. His argument against proceeding to Baghdad after liberating Kuwait was “the inevitable follow-up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad”.
In 2002, as Secretary of State, General Powell took a different view of the pros and cons of ridding the world of Saddam Hussein. He became a prominent advocate of forcible regime change. Had he forgotten his own doctrine?
Probably not. One must remember the context. Most of the leading figures in the Bush fils Administration, including the President himself, saw the War on Terror as a struggle of indefinite duration aimed at destroying a worldwide network of Islamofascist, far Left and other terrorist groups. They had no expectation of winning quickly or, except in the very long run, decisively. Maybe there wouldn’t be a Vietnam level of KIA’s, but the whole enterprise was antithetical to General Powell’s principles.
Invading Iraq could be seen as the way to move back toward the Powell Doctrine. That may not be intuitively obvious, but consider: A war against Saddam Hussein was likely to be a walkover (as it in fact was). After a spectacular success against a long-time enemy, the Administration would be able to declare victory and stop devoting resources to an amorphous conflict with all the world’s evildoers.
What about “the inevitable follow-up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad”? General Powell’s State Department had a simple solution: Let liberated Iraq fend for itself under the tutelage of the United Nations. As Douglas Feith documents in War and Decision, State showed almost no concrete interest in post-liberation planning. The reasonable conclusion is that it looked on the campaign as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end.
At that time, the paradigm for what to do after deposing a tyrant was Yugoslavia, where international agencies had taken up the task of reconstruction. They were inept, and American troops remained present year after year, but there was no serious strain on military resources, and the political fallout inside the United States was negligible. (How many voters care about administrative misfeasance in Bosnia?) State apparently expected a similar outcome in Iraq. Neither it (nor anyone else) anticipated that the mufsidun would launch an offensive there. By conventional reckoning, they would have been suicidal to choose a battlefield dominated by a huge concentration of American military power.
Yet they did. Perhaps they believed that America was a “weak horse” that would bolt at any alarm. Perhaps they were just foolish. The Bush Administration didn’t run away, and in time al-Qa’eda in Iraq lay shattered. The anti-terrorist campaign was, however, long and tedious, and it exposed the Achilles’ heel of the Powell Doctrine: We often don’t know at the beginning of a war whether a quick, overwhelming victory is possible, much less whether it will actually take place. If our initial onslaught doesn’t break the enemy, what should we do? The answer most consistent with the doctrine is to cut our losses and retreat. So far as one can tell, that is the course General Powell favored. Barack Obama definitely did.
The straightforward explanation for General Powell’s Presidential preference, then, is that he and Senator Obama both think defeats are better than slow, expensive victories. Their reasons for thinking that may differ: The general is a realist who seems to doubt that the American public has any stomach for the cost and uncertainties of warfare. The senator has spent his entire life in radical leftist circles, where it is taken for granted that foreign leftists’ critiques of America are words of wisdom that ought to guide our actions.
Notwithstanding their likely disagreements on first principles, the two men are at one on the practical level, so it’s not surprising that Senator Obama has declared that, if he becomes President, General Powell will be among his intimate advisors. That quasi-appointment has a logical corollary: The candidate’s occasional hawkishness vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the Pakistani border regions can be presumed to be no longer operative. No concept could be more alien to the Powell Doctrine than the deployment of major combat forces in the Central Asian wilderness. General Powell will doubtless instruct his protegé that chasing Osama bin-Laden and his lieutenants through mountains controlled by an multitude of independent warrior tribes will be a futile quest, with success improbable and not worth the price. He is also not likely to have much enthusiasm for an indefinite commitment to propping up Kabul against the provinces. If American troops must remain there, lest an Obama Administration be embarrassed by a reversal of campaign rhetoric, they will do so on about the same terms as other NATO forces, that is, in a passive role under constricting rules of engagement. The easy way out will be to negotiate a power-sharing deal with the Taliban, after which the Afghans can once again be forgotten by the world at large.
The Powell Doctrine well suits a diminished American role in international affairs. It is cautious at the outset and will become more so with each defeat. The conjunction of its author and Barack Obama is surely destiny. Lesser reasons really do not matter.