Lest there be any misunderstanding, this post isn’t an exercise in tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner. I don’t believe that the historical links between Ukraine and Russia justify Tsar Putin’s program of uniting by force what are now two distinct countries. I do believe, on the other hand, that refusal to recognize that the Russian view isn’t simply an arbitrary and capricious excuse for naked conquest hinders the formulation of effective policies. One debilitating consequence has been an underestimation of Russians’ willingness to suffer for the sake of victory in the present war. A second is a lack of awareness of the possibilities for peace and reconciliation founded on a common heritage.
Ironically, many of the setbacks to Russia’s own war effort can be traced to its rulers’ misunderstanding of Ukraine. Thinking of the Ukrainians as Russians-at-heart oppressed by neo-Nazis, Putin prepared for a short war against an enemy that he thought would welcome liberation or, at worst, be ambivalent about resisting à l'outrance.
To Americans, it may seem that Ukraine is peripheral to Russia, just as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan were peripheral to the United States, perhaps important for reasons of state but incapable of arousing popular sentiment. There are, however, many reasons for Russians to regard Ukraine in much the same way that the Americans regard Great Britain, that is, as a land to which they have a long and deep historical and cultural attachment, in fact, as the original Russia.
The truth is that Ukraine is to Russia as Great Britain is the United States. Ukraine and Russia had no meaningful separate histories until the Thirteenth Century. After the formation of the first Rus’ state in the Ninth Century, the Grand Principality of Kiev was the center of the Rus’ lands. Attached to it were lesser principalities that were independent in their foreign and domestic policies and yet in some sense belonging to a single entity. Every prince was (at least notionally) descended from the dynastic founder, Rurik. Moreover, the principalities formed a hierarchy. When a prince died, the holders of the lower-ranked appanages moved up. The deceased’s heir had to start on the bottom rung.
The Mongol invasions in the 1240’s broke Rus’ apart. Ukraine fell under Polish domination except for the easternmost, largely unsettled region. The Metropolitans of Kiev, the foremost hierarchs of the Rus’ church, abandoned the city, eventually settling in then-obscure Moscow. Their see is ancestral, albeit in a complicated way, to the present-day Patriarchate.
The breakup of the Rus’ state and the political sway over its lands exercised by Mongols and Poles didn’t wholly sever the ties among the Rus’ peoples. In particular, Orthodoxy remained the common faith. St. Peter Mogila, elevated to a restored Kiev Metropolitanate in 1633, is one of the key figures in Russian Orthodox history. His Orthodox Confession of the Catholic and Apostolic Eastern Church was one of the earliest and most influential Orthodox responses to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the West. His educational reforms and patronage of printing likewise provided the tools needed to preserve Orthodoxy in the face of contemporary challenges.
In 1648, Ukrainians rebelled against Polish rule. After a long, bitter war, the majority of their territory gained independence. Establishing a stable government proved impossible, however. In 1654, the Treaty of Pereiaslav united Ukraine and Muscovy, although the unified Tsarist state was very different from medieval Rus’. During the Soviet era, schoolchildren were taught that the principal motive for the rebellion was Ukrainians’ fervent desire to join their Muscovite brethren in a single state – a dubious historical theory that was inculcated vigorously and is bound to have left a mark on the popular consciousness.
For the next 337 years after Pereiaslav, Ukraine (excepting the western regions that Poland held onto until Austria seized them in the Partitions) was an important part of the Russian Empire. Ukrainians held high positions in the Imperial Army, the Civil Service and the Russian Orthodox Church. Among the luminaries of Russian literature was Mykola Vasyl’ovych Hohol’, whom you know as “Nikolai Gogol”. Many Ukrainians agreed completely with the idea that there was no fundamental difference between the two peoples and adopted without qualms the designation of their territory as “Little Russia”.
These historical facts are not Putinist propaganda. One may find them in Orest Subtelny’s Ukraine: A History, a work that, it has been said, “seep[ed] into the consciousness of those at the forefront of the independence movement and embolden[ed] them”. There are, of course, other facts, such as emergence of a distinctive Ukrainian literary language and national consciousness in the 18th and 19th Centuries, the attempt by both Tsars and Bolsheviks to suppress Ukrainian identity, and, above all, the Holodomor, the Stalin-made famine that killed three or four million Ukrainians.
Soviet oppression led to consequences that haunt Ukrainian nationalism to this day. Ukraine’s hesitancy between evils during World War II is the frail scaffold supporting Putin’s calumnies about a “Nazi regime” in Kiev.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, many Ukrainians preferred the devil they didn’t know to the one that they did. Villages welcomed German soldiers with bread and salt, the traditional symbols of hospitality. Ukrainian collaboration with the invaders was widespread. Some went so far as to enlist in the invaders’ armed forces, which assigned them to such repulsive duties as policing extermination camps.
Needless to say, Adolf Hitler had no more use for Soviet subjects who assisted the Germans than for those who fought against them or tried to remain neutral. All were Slavic Untermenschen destined to be enslaved or starved. A German general said after the war that it was lost on the day that the Wehrmacht entered Kiev and raised the swastika rather than the Ukrainian flag. Once Hitler’s plans for the conquered lebensraum became evident, the leading Ukrainian nationalist groups fought both the Nazis and the communists, a noble effort (continuing for several years after the end of World War II) but doomed to failure.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became, for the first time since the pre-Mongol era, an independent, self-governing nation. It is worth noting that in the referendum on independence from Russia (December 1, 1991), every administrative region in the Russian-majority Donbas voted at least 75 percent “da”. (The only relatively close vote was in Crimea (54.19% in favor).)
Ukraine is not alien to Russia, though it has been alienated. From that fact, we can draw some conclusions. First, the Russian war to subdue Ukraine stems from more than an appetite for random conquest. To attribute it to “security concerns” prompted by Kiev’s potential membership in NATO and the European Union is an obvious error. Russians of the Putin stripe would covet the birthplace of Rus’, were it as neutral as Switzerland, and they are unlikely to be appeased by any partial victory imposed by outside powers.
Second, the mutual history of the two countries could form the foundation for lasting amity. Peoples with close cultural and historical links don’t often become perpetual enemies. The United Kingdom and the United States are the classic example, but the same is true of Spain and its former New World colonies. There is no inherent reason why Kiev and Moscow can’t someday be as friendly as Washington and London.
Admittedly, reconciliation hardly seems possible in the midst of the present war, and a great many Ukrainians evidently want to treat Russia in the way that Black Lives Matter treats America, as an oppressive “colonial” power. Excising everything Russian from Ukraine will, however, leave very little of Ukraine, for Ukraine, not Muscovy, is the real, historical heart of Russia.